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Abstract:
Internal audit has gained the reputation of being a "necessary evil." Thus, many firms are
looking for alternatives to the traditional audit department. Outsourcing ofthe internal audit
function is an option that has become increasingly popular over the past several years, even
though it has been in existence for more than 20 years. Over one-half of the decisions to
outsource have been made over the last five years. Financial institutions, specifically, have been
one of the most active in the decision to outsource. According to a 1997 survey, over one-third
ofthe industry has out-sourced their internal audit function. This paper investigates several
specific institutions and their justifications for outsourcing (or not outsourcing), along with
interviewing the institutions' outside internal audit service provider. The heart ofthis case study
revolves around small to mid-size banks. Interviews with bank executives have lent credible and
relevant knowledge to the study. The root motives behind the outsourcing of the internal audit
department among smaller banks is shown to be an interrelated combination among cost and
quality factors. Furthermore, the choice to outsource (or not to out source) has clearly been in the
best interest of stakeholders. Smaller financial institutions are realizing that in most cases a
higher quality end product can be achieved with little additional cost (or even cost savings) when
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Internal audit departments and internal auditors have come to hold the reputation of being
a "necessary evil" (Serafini 1997). Many business entities have been searching for an alternative
to this internal department, even though its customer focus and quality of products has vastly
improved in more recent years. However, many have hesitated in following through on the
outsourcing of the internal audit function for various reasons, including independence concerns
and loss of core business knowledge. Financial institutions have been the first industry to widely
adopt such outsourcing plans. Individual banks have helped define what will and will not work
in establishing and maintaining an out sourced internal audit department. They have also
provided guidance for other industries to follow.
Outsourcing of the function has become increasingly popular recently, as 55% ofthe
outsourcing decisions have been made in the past five years (Petravick 1997). Outsourcing is not
a new idea, but has been in existence in excess of20 years. Firms chose to outsource functions
that were not core to their business functions and were viewed as general or necessary
operations. The firm was forced to perform such activities as check processing or information
systems, but could not attain a level of specialization nor economies of scale. Therefore, an
outside firm could more effectively and efficiently provide these non-core activities. In this
manner, both the initial business and its new outsource provider may enjoy the benefits created
through economies of scale. Cost was truly at the heart of many of these first relationships, but
firms soon realized that increased quality was another viable by-product. However, businesses
outsourced only those functions that were not core competencies and did not represent vital
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internal activities. Because of this, internal audit was held as just that, internal to the firm. It
was viewed as a necessary function that was simply too important and too proprietary to "hand
off" to another firm.
The banking industry has been at the forefront in applying outsourcing arrangements to
supplement or replace existing in-house functions. Approximately 34% of sampled financial
institutions have out sourced internal audit (Petravick 1997). Banks have also made use of
outsourcing as an alternative to establishing in-house internal audit departments. Smaller to mid-
sized banks have been the most recent participants in this trend.
Large, international and regional banks have the capacity and the range of internal audit
needs to warrant an adequately-trained and extensive internal audit staff with a level of
specialization. They have the size to effectively create economies of scale and can provide
specialized services without acquiring vast increases in costs. Large banks have also participated
in the outsourcing trend but unfortunately, cost (as defined by administrative, equipment, and
office space) has been the primary driving factor. These institutions had the capacity to withhold
a specialized in-house function that created a quality end product, which would rival that ofthe
best outsource provider.
Smaller banks have initiated outsourcing projects often solely because they lack the
capacity and resources of big banks. A specialized internal audit function just cannot be
maintained affordably. Many firms have held in-house functions for years, but are realizing the
benefits of a partial or full outsourcing agreement. They are making use of a "best practice"
approach in following a redefined internal audit mission, as defined by the industry. Other banks
that have never kept an internal audit function are becoming increasingly interested in mitigating
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The expertise and know-how of an outsourcer is vastly above that of a typical bank internal
auditor. Small banks can attain both cost and quality improvements through a decision to
outsource.
Past outsourcing research has focused around the overall outsourcing trend, with several
studies investigating factors relevant to internal audit. However, only a minority of studies has
delved into the banking industry's relatively unique internal audit outsourcing reasoning and
associated outcomes. The few that have worked with financial institutions have either remained
very general in nature or have concentrated on large banks. There has been little to no published
research that has specifically investigated small to mid-size banks, in terms of outsourcing the
internal audit department.
This study was dedicated solely to the unique factors relating to smaller financial
institutions. Research that identified overall outsourcing aspects and trends was reviewed, along
with studies that specialized in internal audit outsourcing (both in general and among banks). In
addition, interviews were conducted with relevant, knowledgeable professionals in the industry.
These professionals are representative of both banking executives and public accountants/
outsource providers. The conclusions and findings derived from this study directly concern
smaller financial institutions and are a product of extensive research of prior publications and in-
depth interviews with banking professionals in the industry.
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Numerous journal articles and studies provided the background and the ideas regarding the
outsourcing of the internal audit department, both among banks and other entities alike. The
benefits, disadvantages, and trends in the outsourcing of the internal audit department among
financial institutions are offered in the following subsection. The characteristics and issues
addressed also relate to the application of internal audit outsourcing in other industries, in
addition to outsourcing in general.
Advantal!es and Associated Benefits of Outsourcinl!
It may be hard to believe, but some banks lack an internal audit department. The shear
costs of establishing and maintaining a competent function can simply outweigh the perceived
benefits. Outsourcing the internal audit function provides an economical and speedy remedy to
the risks and threats associated with no "line of defense" (Barr 1993). An outsource provider can
enter the enterprise offering immediate risk mitigation and assistance in establishing internal
controls. Small banks may make use of the economies of scale that an outsourcer will have in
the realms of expertise, know-how, experience, state-of-the-art equipment, human resource
maintenance, and the like. These are efficiencies in which small to mid-size banks lack the
resources and the breadth to create. "Sweet deals" made to entice just such financial institutions
are used as added incentive to get the sale (Barr 1993). Such deals usually offer the bank a
substantial level of savings over the development ofan in-house function, in the form of very
affordable risk mitigation.
An additional reason to outsource internal audit is that some firms have an in-house
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or valuable contributors. They are viewed as an unnecessary level of bureaucracy and red tape.
Furthermore, in-house internal auditors can emulate bank regulators and intimidate employees.
The bottom line is if an in-house function is not providing talent, is not considered a value-
adding function, and appears stale and incompatible to change, it is a prime candidate for
outsourcing (Merriam 1996). Outsourcers are in the business of providing quality internal audit
services and will assist in alleviating historically problematic areas created by a poor in-house
function.
The elimination of non-productive time can be attained through outsourcing the internal
audit function. Although it may be less apparent in smaller banks, most departments tend to
have some idle time. Such circumstances may arise when senior staff is busy preparing an audit
schedule or finalizing reports. Furthermore, banks may view training time as nonproductive
(Barr 1993). Financial institutions can minimize these idle hours through effective management,
but this inefficiency is almost impossible to eliminate entirely. Outsourcing transfers the
inefficiencies of nonproductive time to the outsource provider and thus eradicates wasted in-
house internal auditor time, ITomthe viewpoint of the bank. It removes one more human
resource management feature of maintaining an in-house staff.
Outsourcing internal audit allows greater flexibility by eliminating a fixed cost and
replacing it with a variable cost (Rittenberg 1999). In-house staffs represent necessary fixed
overhead, such as salaries, office space, equipment, and administrative costs. Office space must
be secured year round, employees need to be retained perpetually, and equipment must be
maintained. However, outsourcing the department alters the scenario by transforming previously
fixed costs into variable costs. Fees are paid on the basis of how much work the provider
performs resulting in a greater level of resource allocation flexibility. Financial institutions are
,
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not bound by a level offixed overhead and are free to decide the dollar amount and the level of
internal audit services to be purchased.
Outsourcing also helps to assure a quality end product. This is a major "selling point" to
potential new clients (Barr 1993). Outsourcing firms have the expertise and access to best
practices that will ensure quality service. Furthermore, the staff is extensively trained to handle
any range of internal control troubles at a client bank and have access to proven solutions that
have succeeded in the past. These circumstances can generate customer satisfaction, at least in
terms of quality.
The adoption of an outsourcing plan allows the bank to focus all of its energies on core
business activities (Verschoor 1992). In the past, some have argued that internal audit is core to
the bank. More recently it has been decided that it is not a matter of who performs the work, but
how that internal audit worked is carried out. Therefore, internal audit has been identified as a
non-core activity and susceptible to outsourcing. Bank executives have looked at internal audit
and recognized that it is not part of their area of expertise (Serafini 1997). In this fashion, the
bank can stress more on its core competencies and cut another distracting, extraneous element of
its overall business.
Outsourcing internal audit can reduce or eliminate the loss of objectivity among internal
auditors. There is less of a chance that an outside auditor can be "bullied" into watering down or
hiding findings (Barr 1996). Internal auditors have strong ties to the company and its personnel.
They have opportunities to develop strong relationships with fellow employees and may be
persuaded by loyalty or request to cover up or reduce the impact of audit findings (Marmon
1999). Outside auditors have no ties to the audited firm and may be less susceptible to such
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bank's board of directors, not bank personnel. An outsourcing arrangement will allow for
honest, forthcoming, and objective internal audit findings. Of course, a fee-based service may
also provide for its own loss of objectivity, but the outsourced staff auditors will have decreased
interaction and loyalties to clients' employees.
Another, often highlighted, benefit of the outsourcing trend is access to specialized
personnel and leading industry practices. Out source providers can offer a range of expertise and
specialization that is too expensive for most financial institutions to maintain internally (Aldhizer
1996). Outsourced auditors have a broad background and access to "best practices" in the
industry. They have encountered common issues and concerns at other banks and are prepared
to apply previously proven solutions to current clients. This is experience that can be very
difficult to generate within smaller financial institutions. Therefore, banks can benefit from the
know-how that out sourced auditors have gained from other institutions (their competitors).
A key role for internal audit is in establishing fraud control. Outsourcing the function
transfers the performance ofthe audit work, but also may transfer some of the risk (Aldhizer
1996). The outsourcer inevitably accepts part of the responsibility for detecting and controlling
fraud. It also may face the associated litigation that accompanies the discovery of fraud.
Furthermore, many outsource providers retain liability insurance to back up the quality of their
audit work (Verschoor 1992). This could prove to be a valuable risk mitigation tool, as any
blame for breaches of internal control (along with the financial responsibility) may fall in the
hands of the outsourcer.
Finally, outsourcing promotes economies of scale. The related cost savings are at the
center of why companies outsource. Cost effectiveness is the motive that started the outsourcing
trend. Firms specializing in one area of service can attain economies of scale, and thus offer




















then- services at a lower cost than an organization could create on then- own. These economies of
scale apply not only to administrative and overhead costs, but instill an unparalleled level of
expertise and real-world know-how among staff auditors (Rittenberg 1999). The ideal case
represents improved services at a lower cost. This case is not uncommon, as many financial
intuitions have realized both of these benefits by outsourcing then- internal audit function.
Neeative Factors and Threats to Outsourcine
The attitudes, expectations, and reactions of bank personnel need to be taken into great
consideration prior to a decision to outsource. Outsourcing provides for a possible loss ofloyalty
among bank employees. It is expected that the staff auditors of outsourcers will hold premier
ties with the provider, but that is an expected benefit. The potential for mixed allegiance
becomes stronger when considering remaining bank employees that have "survived"
outsourcing. It is widely known that an ill-planned and improperly implemented outsourcing
arrangement can crush employee morale (Rittenberg 1999). Furthermore, in-house auditors
will be more inclined to take the extra initiative to improve the organization's efficiency because
he/she is dn-ectly affected by the success or failure of the bank (Barr 1993). These factors can
undermine an otherwise successful outsourcing agreement.
An in-house audit staff can act as a conduit for future management. The best thing to do with
the brightest auditors is to groom them for management positions within the bank (Serafini
1997). Many organizations have used this aspect of an in-house staff as an added benefit. There
is probably no better way in which to learn the intricacies of a financial institution than an
assignment to the internal audit department. A corporate internal audit experience is viewed by
many as an "in-house MBA program" because auditors cover all facets of operations (Barr
.
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1993). A multi-year assignment in internal audit will create a clear picture of the organization in
the mind ofthe auditor. An in-house internal audit arrangement develops interdepartmental
relationships and establishes goal congruence, as the mission of the firm is dispersed throughout
the company. Outsourcing the staff eliminates these benefits and abolishes an invaluable
training ground for future executives.
Outsourcing may create a lack oflong-range development, in return for short-range cost
savings (Klinkerman 1998). In-house auditors are aware of past, present, and future problematic
areas. Their expertise and knowledge of the intricacies ofthat particular institution are products
oftheir long-term commitment and experience with that one bank. There exists a level of
relevant and unique expertise among bank staff auditors that cannot be easily recreated by an
outsource provider's internal audit staff Outsourcing plans often do not allow time for an
auditor to develop an in-depth knowledge ofthe bank's business and its individual and unique
risks. Therefore, a valuable long-range planning and risk mitigation tool may be traded for cost
savings that are more short-run in nature (Acciani 1995).
The potential loss of independence has been a major concern of outsourcing when using the
existing external auditor. A conflict of interest may arise when the external auditor also provides
internal audit services (Marmon 1999). Even public firms have expressed their own concerns
over possible independence issues where they perform both external and internal audits (Acciani
1995). The AICPA has established that as long as the auditor assumes no responsibility of, nor
performs management functions, independence will not be violated. This issue may be
eliminated through the use of another firm for outsourcing but many banks wish to make use of
the relationship that they have cultivated with their existing external auditor. Furthermore, even






if the AICPA's rules are adhered to and no actual loss of independence occurs, the appearance of
a lack of independence may remain.
It may become all too apparent that goals ofthe outsourcer may differ with that of bank
management. This can occur through the lack of communication between management and the
service provider. Some banks view outsourcing as an arrangement in which the entire function,
ranging from planning all the way to follow-ups, is the responsibility of the provider. This
incorrect attitude can spell imminent disaster for the arrangement. Many times, the financial
institution is expected to retain an internal audit director onboard to oversee the function and to
serve as a liaison with bank management (Anderson 1996). This liaison coordinates the efforts
ofthe outsourcer, but also represents a significant fixed cost to the bank.
The contracted internal auditor may merely follow the prescribed business plan, and not seek
ways to improve the business (Marmon 1999). Internal audit is the process of proactively
seeking ways to improve processes, mitigate risk, reduce costs, and stimulate revenues. If the
outsourcer does not adhere to the very foundation behind the existence of an internal audit
department, then outsourcing may indeed be an unsuccessful endeavor.
Many recent college graduates begin their careers as staff auditors. As outsourcing internal
audit becomes increasingly popular, there will surely be vast internal audit opportunities for
these relatively inexperienced, young auditors. How will this new auditor view the internal audit
staff?
[Perhaps as] "a tool for external audit to use to reduce the level of testing? A low-level
compliance checking activity, not requiring excessive accounting proficiency, judgment,
or business sense? Given the limited exposure of this external auditor to the realms of
internal audit, one would perhaps understand if this was the perception that was formed,"
(Crawford 1996).
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This example may be somewhat of an over dramatization, but an outsourcer may make use of
inexperienced staff, and a staff that does not understand and value the true purpose of internal
audit. Several firms have expressed dissatisfaction with the "inexperience" of many staff
auditors performing internal audit work (Chapman 1997). The real intent of internal auditing is
the review of operations and control systems and the push towards economy, effectiveness, and
accountability. These are internal issues and an overall atmosphere that an inexperienced auditor
may miss as an internal audit out source provider.
The loss of continuous, on-site auditor presence is one concrete disadvantage to outsourcing
on which everyone will agree. In-house auditors are available for special assignments anytime
throughout the year, not only during scheduled audits or the CPA firm slack season (Verschoor
1992). Furthermore, in-house auditors can monitor policies and employees as concerns arise.
They are involved with trouble areas before problems may become overwhelmingly apparent.
Outsourcing eliminates a highly useful level of in-house, easily-accessible expertise. It removes
the closeness of the audit function to the corporate culture of the financial institution (Crawford
1996).
Another fear of jumping on the outsourcing bandwagon is that providers may command a
greater premium for their services as time progresses (Rittenberg 1999). Firms are offering their
services at very low prices as an added inducement to banks to accept the outsourcing plan.
Some providers are even thought to be providing these services at a loss so as to establish a
larger internal audit customer base. This "low-balling" entices banks to abandon their in-house
functions because of the enhanced monetary savings (Barr 1993). However, as the relationship
solidifies, the provider may indeed raise the fees in order to make a greater profit (or make a
profit at all). The bottom line is that outsourcers enter such agreements to make money. It is
I







inconceivable to think that an outsider firm will trim its fees for its clients' benefit (Acciani
1995). After the bank has eliminated its in-house internal audit function, it is almost at the
mercy of outsource providers. The time and money to recreate an in-house staff prohibit an
expedient and affordable regression.
Finally, the "Chinese Wall effect" is another concern that is raised in opposition of
outsourcing internal audit. In cases where the outsource provider is also the external auditor,
there is the possibility ofthe external auditors learning a~ut internal audit issues before
management has had a chance to fully address the issue. "Lots of small issues come up in your
internal audits that are not truly a problem," according to John Rezich, controller of True North
Communications. "We ended up with very excitable external auditors." None ofthe external
staffs concerns proved to warrant changing the scope ofthe audit (Barr 1996).
Industry Trends
A thorough research study investigating the outsourcing ofthe internal audit function
among financial institutions has been performed through a team-effort between Crowe, Chizek
and Company, LLP and the Financial Managers Society. The results ofthis survey have
highlighted several interesting industry trends. Charts and graphs depicting the results of this
survey, in addition to a more detailed description ofthe survey, are included in Appendix I.
Each chart displays significant elements of the internal audit outsourcing revelation
among banks, but special attention should be paid to the present percentage of banks that have
followed through on an outsourcing decision. The single most important reason that internal
audit was out sourced is also of key importance and follows ideas presented in this study.
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Finally, the expectation of financial institutions to outsource in the future is presented. This
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Professional Views
Interviews were conducted with professionals, both in the banking industry and in public
accounting. Sampled financial institutions ranged in size from approximately 35 million dollars
to almost one billion dollars in asset base. The lone delegate from public accounting represents a
regional firm that provides internal audit outsourcing services and external audit services to
financial institutions (including 5 of the 6 sampled banks). The views and opinions of
professionals relative to internal audit, and the outsourcing of it, are summarized in the following
subsections. The following views are not direct quotations, but are paraphrased and written in
first person tense.
Co-Sourcinl! Enabled Us to Get the Job Done
Mr. Joseph O. Gaffino was a corporate auditor of the former Merchants Bancorp Banks
headquartered in Aurora, Illinois. Merchants had approximately one dozen branches and a $1
billion asset base prior to its assumption by Old Kent Bank in 2000. Old Kent Bank is the fifth
largest bank in the state of Illinois with an asset base in excess of $22 billion.
Historically, Merchants Bank has retained an in-house audit function. We had around a
dozen branches (before our subsequent buyout by Old Kent Bank) and were one of the last
remaining "hometown, locally-owned" banks in the Aurora area. Outsourcing had really never
come up until Coopers & Lybrand tried to sell us on the idea several years ago. At the time,
Merchants was committed to holding internal audit as an in-house function. We felt that an
outsource provider was only going to "scratch the surface" of issues that our institution felt were
important. So at the time, we rejected Coopers & Lybrand's proposal.
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Merchants had outsourced areas like data processing previously, but departments closer
to the core of the bank (like internal audit) were retained in-house. The outsourcing of internal
audit didn't come up again until Merchants purchased a holding company containing three banks
that held a combined $150 million of assets. Each of these three institutions had their internal
audit departments completely outsourced to Crowe, Chizek and Company, LLP. That fact
reprised the discussion of outsourcing internal audit again.
As far as our external auditor, we made use ofKPMG Peat Marwick. However, as Peat
was a big six firm (now big five), we felt that their scope was simply set too high. Merchants
just wasn't big enough to warrant a big six firm. We made a change to Crowe (a regional, mid-
tier firm), as far as our external auditing, because we felt our size and goals were closer to being
parallel with that of Crowe. That was a decision that Merchants was very satisfied with.
Now when we purchased that three-bank holding company, we kept all of the old staff on
board. We had a commitment to the communities that we had become a part of and didn't cut
the existing staff. The outsourcing of internal audit among these banks was where things became
more complicated. As we further investigated the outsourcing agreements, Crowe's approach
began to look more appealing. At the time, our existing audit staff only had so much time to
complete projects. Our workloads sometimes didn't allow us to get everything done in a timely
fashion. It came down to "knowledge versus time." We had to get the work done and an
arrangement with Crowe could help us to attain that goal. Crowe has a lot of experience in
banking and a lot of experienced auditors. They were already our external auditors and they
knew their stuff As a result of our need to get our internal auditing done in a more timely
fashion and the experience and expertise that Crowe has in the industry, we entered into a co-
sourcing agreement with them.
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This arrangement allowed us to retain our existing internal auditors, but enabled us to use
Crowe in areas where our staff lacked expertise, or time. We knew that the outsourced auditors
that came in to assist us would be experienced because we had a chance to see their resumes
firsthand. The co-sourcing agreement allowed us to use the expertise of Crowe on an as-needed
basis. We really didn't see any effects on cost because our own internal audit function eased up.
Merchants also made a good training ground for Crowe's junior auditors. They got a chance to
see how things should be done, as we were small enough to allow them to see the whole
business. In retrospect, Crowe's services were "top-notch." Merchants entered into this ''team''
agreement with Crowe three years ago.
The level of recent mergers in the industry displays how banks can combat shrinking
profits by gaining economies of scale and eliminating "backroom staff." This was the fate that
Merchants met. Old Kent Bank purchased us and consolidated most of our administrative
function with that of their own, resulting in the elimination of many jobs. Internal audit was one
of the lost departments, as Old Kent already had a full-outsourcing agreement in place with
Arthur Anderson.
"But That Isn't Worth Fifty-Thousand Bucks a Year"
Mr. Joachim "Jock" J. Brown is president and CEO of the First National Bank of Ottawa. This
is a locally-owned bank with four branch offices in Ottawa, Illinois. The First National Bank
wasfounded in 1865 and has an asset base of $230 million.
I've only been at the First National Bank for about four months now. No public firms
have tried to "sell" me on the idea of outsourcing internal audit, but I suspect that will change.
The financial institutions that I have worked at previously all had their internal audit functions
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outsourced. Banks outsource for cost savings and improved services, not one or the other. We
have considered outsourcing internal audit in the past and it will definitely be coming up in the
future.
Crowe, Chizek and Company, LLP is our current external auditor and we have chosen to
keep our internal audit function in-house thus far. Our current department is made up of two
full-time auditors and one full-time loan review officer. However, I am not satisfied with our
current scenario. Internal audit is not aligned with the shareholders' interests and they have no
concern for earnings and growth. Internal audit intimidates our employees, creates a level of
bureaucracy, and emulates bank regulators. Regulators are, in effect, working for an insurance
company who sets the standards, so they have a right to use a level of discretion. However, our
own internal staff is on our side and should not create tension to such an extent.
Outsourcing would alleviate many ofthe problems that our own internal audit department
has created. Outsourced auditors would "quit picking on the little stuff' and focus more on
larger, more material issues. Outsourcing would also save the First National Bank
approximately $50 thousand annually. But, following through on an outsourcing agreement
requires that we have sound procedures in place. Outsourced internal auditors need to check
risks as we go, and not at year-end when the external auditors visit.
We really aren't concerned with the outsourcing of our local jobs. Our internal audit
department isn't focused on our core competency. We also aren't concerned with the time
requirements around the job. The outsource providers would come in at various times
throughout the year. The only reservation I have about that set-up is that nobody will be here "to
count the cash when somebody steals." We will be losing a level of in-house expertise and we
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won't have auditors on-site to see what is going on everyday. We would lose those benefits and
that know-how, "but that isn't worth 50 thousand bucks a year."
We probably would have already outsourced the function except that I am not satisfied
with Crowe's (and other firms') statistical sampling methods. They would rely on 6% ofloans
to pass judgment on the whole. However, that 6% could miss the three biggest loans that we
have. As a smaller bank, we can't just miss risks that great. The statistical sample claims to
provide broad coverage and to alleviate risk, but I am not convinced. A more judgmentally
selected sample would help to minimize this risk. An outsourcer providing a hierarchy of risk
would make me feel better, but would require them to alter the scope of the audit. The
outsourcing of the internal audit department will come up in the future. If Crowe (or some other
firm) agrees to a plan outlining increased testing, we will probably agree to outsource our
internal audit function.
Initial We Never Maintained an Internal Audit De artment
Mr. Richard J. Worzala is the president Mokena State Bank located in Mokena, Illinois. This
institution has one office and an asset base of $50 million. However, it is a member of a holding
corporation that owns several banks.
We (our holding company) purchased this bank in 1993. At the time, it was failing. We
wanted to get the best rating from our regulation agency and we needed an internal audit
program to get it. However, Mokena State didn't have the size or the resources to warrant
generating an in-house function. We made the choice to outsource our "agreed-upon
procedures" four years ago.
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You'll find that the bulk of internal audit outsourcing arrangements involve smaller
financial institutions. Banks of a greater size have the economies of scale and the financial
resources to hold a broad range of expertise in-house. Smaller banks are the ones who turn to
outsourcers because we lack the size to justify a large investment in an internal audit function.
Mokena State (along with the other banks in our holding company) uses KPMG Peat
Marwick as our external auditors. However, we feel that because Peat is a big five firm, they
don't relate with us well. When we began searching for an internal audit outsourcer, we looked
to smaller firms. We also wanted to maintain auditor independence in relation to our agreed-
upon procedures and our year-end audits. We wanted to have two separate firms performing
these duties and totally bypass any possibility of a lack of independence. We solicited bids ITom
several firms (including Crowe, Chizek and Company, LLP) and excluded Peat ITomthis process
to maintain both real and apparent independence.
Mokena State ended up choosing Crowe to perform our agreed-upon procedures. We felt
that they had the expertise and experience in performing this function. They already perform
similar services for many banks our size. Crowe and its auditors tend to be able to "see the forest
through the trees."
Our goal for the new arrangement was to create a "good end product." Crowe tests
Mokena State's controls and makes recommendations for improvements. Sometimes, as in our
case, having a very high level of due control is not feasible. The service that Crowe provides has
left us very satisfied. "I can sleep at night!"
As far as setting up our audit schedule, we sit down and discuss what issues are to be
investigated. It is really a team effort between the folks here at Mokena State. We submit our
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requests to Crowe and they develop a proposal from that. Their proposal is then subject to the
approval of Mokena State.
Cost was a factor in our decision to outsource internal audit. We didn't perform it at all
initially and we couldn't afford (in terms of money and time) to generate an in-house function.
Outsourcing provided a fast, affordable solution to investigate our agreed-upon procedures and
minimize the risk that we carried in not having an internal audit department.
Our Pros ective Outsourcer Recommended We Kee the Function In-House
Mr. Richard J Katz is president of Resource Bank of DeKalb, Illinois. Resource has five
branches within DeKalb County and has an asset base of$175 million. It is also in the process
of constructing a new office in the city of DeKalb.
We currently have a one-person internal audit department that is responsible for loan
review, regulation compliance, and other internal audit issues. Resource has been moving to
more of a risk-based audit approach. Our external auditor, McGladrey and Pullen, LLP, has
been assisting us in our transition to this risk-based approach. Our controller is a CPA that came
from KPMG Peat Marwick and participated in our cursory examination of an outsourcing
arrangement.
When the outsourcing question came up, we turned to our external auditor, McGladrey,
for more information. They currently provide internal audit services to a sizable number of
financial institutions. Recently, McGladrey took over the entire internal audit function of a
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Resource has tried to come up with the best solution in terms of "internal resources,
price, and people." Outsourcing would have yielded benefits in the realms of expertise and
specialization. However, the aspect of cost was an overwhelming factor. McGladrey couldn't
compete with the services that our in-house shop provides for what it costs us. In our case,
outsourcing the internal audit department would have increased our costs. McGladrey took a
stance opposite to what one may think and advised us to retain our department internally. Via
our preliminary discussions, McGladrey admitted that they couldn't be as good a solution for the
cost. Overall, we are very satisfied with the work of our internal audit department. "It does a
good job."
Our Internal Audit Function Couldn't Kee Pace With Our Ra id Growth
Mr. Kurt R. Stevenson is vice president & controller of Union Bancorp, Inc. Union Bank is
headquartered in Ottawa, Illinois and has approximately eight branch offices throughout
northern Illinois. Its asset base is in the $700 million range. Furthermore, Union Bank acts as a
holding corporation that owns several other Illinois-based banks.
In 1996, we were a two-bank holding company with a three-person internal audit staff
(one supervisor and two auditors). By the end of 1996, we had purchased two additional holding
companies and jumped from two to nine banks. This transaction also spread Union Bank out
over a large geographical area. To further complicate matters, our newly purchased banks were
small, independent, and without a system of internal controls. One lone, young and
inexperienced auditor served six of these newly acquired banks. We split up our staff in an
attempt to cover all of our bases, but our extended risk was great. We simply didn't have the
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Initially, we used McGladrey & Pullen, LLP as our external auditor. However, Union
Bank lacked the level of comfort that we felt was necessary to solidify our relationship. That led
us to change to Crowe, Chizek and Company, LLP for our external audit services in 1997. When
the discussion of outsourcing internal audit came up, I believe that we actually approached
Crowe on the matter.
We out sourced our entire internal audit function to Crowe in April of 1998. It finally
came down to us admitting that we just couldn't adequately perform the function in-house. Our
staffwas significantly under-manned and our newly acquired banks lacked knowledge and
expertise at the internal audit level. Generating an adequate in-house function was a burden
(both financially and administratively) that Union Bank couldn't afford to make.
The full outsourcing arrangement left us with our existing staff. Fortunately, we had
other value-adding positions in the company to offer our old internal audit staff Our two
auditors took advantage of these positions and we took advantage ofthe in-house expertise that
they had to offer. This way we used their know-how in other departments within the bank.
We did have some concerns over auditor independence, as Union Bank now used the
same firm for both external and internal audits. However, Crowe has a good operation and does
a good job of maintaining independence. They have split up their internal and external services
and maintain them independently.
Our audit schedule pivots around our liaison with Crowe. Our liaison is an employee of
the bank that coordinates the calendar, picks out concerns and issues to be investigated, and
facilitates active communication between the audit team and Union Bank. Essentially, our
liaison directs the activities of Crowe's staff
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We have been "very pleased with the initial service" of Crowe. They have proven to be
quite knowledgeable and personable. The managers and supervisors are experienced in our
industry and they have developed a ''very hands-on" approach. Union Bank has developed a
level of comfort with Crowe (both in internal and external audits), that was something lacking
ITomthe relationship with our previous external firm. We now have expertise in internal audit
and are covering all of our banks. Furthermore, our relatively young management team realizes
that auditors are only here to help. The internal audit function has the shareholders' best interests
in mind.
Our only reservation is that Crowe can miss risks that an in-house, on-site function would
catch. As we have developed a comfort level with Crowe, we tend to wonder what risks still go
unchecked. However, our rapid growth necessitated action, and outsourcing made the most
sense. Crowe has met our expectations and Union Bank is very satisfied with their services.
We Lack the Resources to Perform Internal Audits. Period
Mr. Robert E. Harris is president of Twin Oaks Savings Bank located in Marseilles, Illinois.
This institution is a local, community bank that has one branch located in downtown Marseilles.
They are currently constructing another branch office in Morris, Illinois. Twin Oaks has an
asset base of $37 million.
We currently use Crowe, Chizek and Company, LLP as our external auditors. Crowe
also has a good internal audit outsourcing service, but our size limits our choices. Twin Oaks is
a small, local, community-oriented bank. Ifwe were larger, yes, outsourcing would be a viable
choice. Also, as a $35 million shop, we lack the workload to keep an in-house internal audit
function busy.
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Right now, an internal audit function is not in the best interest of our stakeholders, who
Our current scenario concentrates on controlling costs. We make the best possible use of
our external auditors and bank examiners for mitigating risks. Twin Oaks is also very dedicated
to the training and development of its employees. We spend a lot of money sending supervisors
to seminars and conferences, so they come back to us and perform a better job. Supervisors also
assist in doing a lot of the internal checking. Furthermore, those employees bring their
newfound knowledge back to the firm and share it with others.
Besides, we are at the mercy of regulators. An outsourcer has no more insight of what
changes the future will bring than we do. Having an outstanding internal audit function is not
going to ease our adaptations to new regulations and outsourcing isn't guaranteed to provide us a
high-quality service. We rely on our in-house expertise to cope with the ever-changing
environment.
Our management attends our examiners' exit meetings, so they know their responsibility
and what is going on with the bank. We utilize our examiners to make changes for the better.
We train our supervisors to assist in checking internal controls and we make use of our external
auditors' suggestions to minimize risk. The scrutiny of auditors and examiners makes us a better
institution. That is how we survive without an internal audit function (either in-house or
outsourced).
are our friends, our relatives, and our neighbors. Twin Oaks strives to invest and better our
community. We work to provide the best service possible with the resources that we have. Our
goal is to improve and nurture the community in which we, too, are a part. Sacrificing a part of
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The Outsourcin of Internal Audit Is Goin to Continue
Mr. Robert 1. Farrar, CPA is an engagement executive at the public accounting firm of Crowe,
Chizek and Company, LLP. Mr. Farrar is based out of Crowe's Oak Brook, Illinois office.
Crowe Chizek is a regional, mid-tier accounting firm that also has a large division specializing
in the banking industry. Furthermore, Crowe Chizek has an independent internal audit staff that
provides outsourcing services to companies, including financial institutions.
Really, Crowe, Chizek and Company, LLP has always provided internal audit services to
our clients on some level. Initially, those services focused a lot around "agreed-upon
procedures," in which we essentially extended our external audit a little deeper into internal
matters (in addition to the fact that we didn't have a differentiated internal audit services team at
the time). In cases like these, the client probably didn't have an internal audit department and
wanted some additional risk coverage. Crowe didn't start to really "hone in" on internal audit
services until 1994 or 1995. It was at this time that we noticed an apparent client need in terms
of internal audit, plus regulation compliance and information systems audit. I believe that it was
also around that time when the Federal Reserve Board identified that financial institutions should
evaluate risks on a grander scale. We also had clients that were experiencing large turnovers
within their internal audit staff. They turned to us to provide some continuity in their function.
Our (already large) financial institution client base eased our transition into internal audit
outsourcing. We had a staff that was experienced in the industry, plus we hired on additional
trained staff. We brought on experienced bank internal auditors and operational employees. We
also utilized our financial institution group extensively. A lot of our out source clients were
looking for that kind of expertise in their internal audit function and turned to outsourcing.
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Either their current external auditor didn't have that expertise or they wanted to split up the
functions from an independence standpoint, but in each circumstance, these financial institutions
wound up at Crowe for their internal audit services.
In the case of smaller, community banks, it is usually more cost effective if the internal
audit outsourcer and the external auditor are one and the same firm. However, when this
circumstance arises, questions of auditor independence may surface. We have strived to
alleviate such concerns that our clients may have. First, many of our internal audit customers use
Crowe for only that purpose. They have chosen to retain a separate external auditor (for
whatever reason) and have bypassed any concerns of independence. Second, we have worked
hard to maintain separate staffs and separate teams of auditors. The external and internal audit
functions are each independent of one another and in no way should create independence
problems. Our internal audit function abides by the AICPA ruling on providing such services.
We do not participate in the operations of the client and do not make decisions in their
operations. Management can outsource the performance of internal audit, but they can't
out source the responsibility for it. Crowe "comments on controls. We are not the control." All
of these factors work to maintain Crowe's independence from the client.
Our internal audit service has spawned from client needs, so we have used our existing
external audit customers as a base for new internal audit clients to some extent. We have
established a large network in the industry (as we have a specialty in financial institutions) and
we get a lot of referrals for our work. We don't "cold call" banks looking for new business, but
get our name out through our network of people in the industry. Crowe gets a lot of new internal
audit business in just that fashion. And, yes, we do a little marketing of our benefits and
expertise, too.
Internal audit outsourcing probably began with "agreed-upon procedures," which are
really an extension of a public firm's external audit. Firms extended the scope oftheir existing
external audit to cover some internal issues at the same time. However, a need has arisen for
internal audit outsourcing beyond the agreed-upon procedures level. We still perform audits of
agreed-upon procedures, but Crowe focuses more on the extension of such a situation. We can
provide "specialty" work in areas in which an in-house internal audit staff lacks the know-how.
We can help eliminate the difficulties in recruiting knowledgeable in-house internal auditors.
Crowe fills the needs of internal audit customers and (in the case of partial outsourcing) helps
existing in-house functions achieve their goals. Crowe's services can be used to supplement an
existing function, totally replace it, or help create an internal audit function that never before
existed.
Our arrangement is simplified through the establishment of a liaison between the client
and ourselves. The liaison is an employee ofthe client, but also works closely with our staff.
He/she coordinates the internal audit schedule, determines what issues are to be investigated, and
signs off on all of our work. The liaison acts as the "eyes and ears" of internal audit on a year-
round basis and scouts for problems as they may occur. Our staff may be on-site only a few
times throughout the year so the liaison coordinates our efforts. The success of our internal audit
services pivots around our constant communication with the client. The liaison is a part of that
communication. Our services are structured so that the client is always aware of the proceedings
and findings of our internal audits. Results ofthe audit are discussed with management before
our staff leaves the site, usually at the exiting meeting, and issues are discussed as they arise, too.
Management is required to respond to issues uncovered during the audit and the liaison must also
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responses and formulating recommendations. The arrangement is also based on the timeliness.
Crowe's turnaround on the final report is approximately 20-30 days and management generates
their responses within 10-15 days.
The decision to out source is really up to the opinion of senior management. Some want
the accessibility and at-hands expertise of an in-house function. Others have come to the
conclusion that the most effective solution in terms of cost, expertise, and internal management
(recruiting, administrative, etc.) is outsourcing. Smaller banks have been the first to realize that
these benefits are hard (but not impossible) to achieve with an in-house function and outsourcing
"adds value immediately." So when it comes down to it, the outsourcing choice depends on the
audit committee and the "comfort level" of management.
The trend of internal audit outsourcing is going to continue, even with banks that retain
an in-house function. Outsourcing will provide financial institutions with specialty needs that
are hard to generate, and maintain, in-house. Outsourcing will also continue to supplement
existing internal staffs. Many of our internal audit clients contacted us about our services and in
most cases in which we evaluate their current set-up, there is an apparent need for our services.
It is very hard to keep a well-trained internal audit staff in-house. We can provide those services
and maintain a well-versed and experienced staff at a competitive price. Many small banks just
do not have the breadth (nor the work) to warrant an adequate internal staff and bank internal
auditors are typically not specialized. These are all resources that we can provide though an
outsourcing arrangement.
A sample engagement letter has been included in Appendix II. Special attention should be paid
to the responsibilities of the CPA firm and the bank. These responsibilities outline the
necessities of a successful outsourcing arrangement, along with an outline of proposed services.
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Summary & Conclusions
The recent phenomenon of outsourcing has truly spread out from non-core, miscellaneous
functions, such as check processing and information systems, to more "core" services. This is
the direction that an increasing number of internal audit departments are heading: being either
partially or totally outsourced. The trend has been most apparent in the banking industry and, as
this study has shown, especially in smaller banks. Outsourcing of the internal audit function is a
topic that all of the sampled institutions had considered in some respect. Even though all had not
adopted the measure, they all had come to conclusions about the adequacy oftheir own internal
audit staff From the conversations with these professionals, it is safe to say that those that have
not yet out sourced may revisit the idea in the future. The concerns and views ofthese banking
professionals were very similar in most respects. However, the following common concerns (or
comforts) warrant further review.
Costs have historically been a major driver of outsourcing. This is representative of
financial institutions and the reasoning behind outsourcing internal audit. The economies of
scale created when a firm specializes and performs a similar service for multiple institutions
helps all involved to mitigate costs. However, the expertise and knowledge that such an
arrangement provides is an associated benefit that cannot be valued in monetary terms.
Outsourcing is known for improving the internal audit function, and it is this aspect for which
many banks and outsourcers strive. The monetary savings, though, are often times how the idea
is "sold."
An unsatisfactory internal audit department may also be quickly remedied through an
outsourcing decision. The time and money to rebuild the function with a new mission and better
focus can be transferred to an outsourcer. Furthermore, outsourcing will yield a significantly
smaller bill (in terms of both time and money) than if the institution attempts to redirect the
internal audit department on its own. A lack of in-house expertise can be remedied in the same
fashion and yield identical results.
Risk mitigation is another benefit that outsourcing internal audit will create. Outsourcers
will bear some level of responsibility for the services they provide. They often hold insurance
for any subsequent litigation that typically follows the discovery of fraud. Because out source
providers have a much broader expertise than in-house auditors and because they hold a position
of greater independence, it is more likely that outsourcing will find fraud and render suggestions
for improvement consistently.
The growth in the need of internal audit is and will be another driver ofthe trend to
outsource. Banks are realizing that their internal risks must be mitigated and internal audit is a
necessary function. Furthermore, as banks continue to merge and grow, their needs within
internal audit are likely to increase proportionally. As these institutions grow (many times quite
rapidly), outsourcing provides a means to "keep up" in terms of internal audit.
Outsourcing firms are marketing their services very well. The benefits are highlighted
and the disadvantages are diminished. Financial and quality factors are used in the end to sell the
job and get the sale.
There were also several key shortcomings that banking professionals identified. The
major unanswered questions related to the loss of in-house knowledge and on-site presence.
These are the drawbacks that providers have not yet minimized through full outsourcing
arrangements. Financial intuitions gain a level of confidence by having an on-site staff. There is
always someone around keeping an eye on the business. Furthermore, the level of knowledge
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held by internal auditors is very helpful to have on hand. These professionals can be utilized
year-round in other areas to more effectively establish sound procedures and mitigate risk.
In conclusion, outsourcing has proven to be a viable and beneficial alternative to holding
an in-house staff Its benefits often outweigh its costs (in the banking industry), in terms of both
money and quality. However, full outsourcing carries some drawbacks that are of key concern to
professionals in the industry. The solution to this uneasiness is partial outsourcing. Financial
institutions (such as Merchants Bank) have retained an internal staff within the bank, but have
contracted an outsourcing firm to provide for special requests and to help in times of need. The
costs of such an arrangement can be no more than that of an internal staff and the "sticky points"
that have led many executives to feel uncomfortable with the outsourcing idea are eliminated. In
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Appendix I
The following charts and statistical data relate to the 1999 Internal Audit Survey. The Financial
Managers Society (FMS) and Crowe, Chizek and Company, LLP engaged the Gary Siegel
Organization to conduct a survey of community financial institutions. The purpose of the study
was to:
~ determine whether internal audit is performed in-house or outsourced
~ determine if a trend towards the outsourcing of the internal audit department exists
~ establish industry standards that provide operational benchmarks for in-house internal
audit functions
A questionnaire was created (with input ITomCrowe Chizek and FMS) and mailed to a random
sample of2,000 financial institutions. Completed, useable surveys were received ITom425
participants (a response rate of21 %).
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This letter confirms our understanding of the arrangements for Crowe, Chizek and Company




Crowe Chizek will meet with your management and assist in developing a risk based extended
audit plan for the mortgage banking area. This plan will be approved by management and/ or
the Audit Committee and executed by us. We will direct, review and supervisE: the day to day
performance of the audit program. However, we cannot perform management functions, make
management decisions or give the appearance of acting in a capacity equivalent to a member of
bank management or as an employee. In this regard, while we may advise, we cannot act in a
decision making capacity in committees and meetings that determine the institution's strategic
direction or act in a decision making capacity as to the design, implementation, and evaluation
of internal controls, new products, services, or software that are significant to the institution's
business activities. Additionally, we cannot be involved in activities such as authorizing,
executing, or consummating transactions or otherwise exercising authority on behalf of the
Bank. Accordingly, we cannot perform ongoing monitoring activities or control activities,
prepare source documents on transactions, or have custody of bank assets.
We will submit a report within four weeks after the conclusion of our fieldwork on the results
of our extended audit services. We will meet with your coordinator to discuss the specific
procedures performed and our detailed findings so that our report will summarize only those
findings your coordinator believes warrant review by the Audit Committee. We will discuss
significant matters that come to our attention with appropriate bank management
representatives. We will also issue our report in draft form before we issue our final report.
This will allow bank management time to review these matters in advance and determine
whether they wish to engage us to perform extended procedures in response to the identified
matters. Our report will summarize the areas covered and our findings and recommendations.
CROWE,CHIZEK AND COMf'A:'-JY LLf'
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The extended audit services contemplated within the context of this engagement letter include
the concepts of selective testing and sampling. Accordingly, these services would of necessity
not include all aspects of the Bank's internal controls nor would they include a detailed
examination of all transactions. Therefore, they cannot be relied upon to disclose all errors or
irregularities that may exist. These services would also not ordinarily address abuses of
management discretion.
We agree to allow the Bank and its bank regulatory examiners to have reasonable and timely
access, under our supervision, to the extended audit services workpapers and reports which,
when not on-site with us at the Bank, will be located in our office in Oak Brook, Illinois.
The Bank's Responsibilities
The Bank is responsible for designating a competent individual preferably within senior
management, to be responsible for and oversee the extended audit function. This individual
will be the liaison with Crowe Chizek and will be the coordinator for all extended audit
activities and services. The coordinator will work with Crowe Chizek and other members of
bank management and be responsible for control risk assessments, audit plans, audit programs
and audit reports. The coordinator will be responsible for determining and approving the risk,
scope, and frequency of extended audit activities.
The Audit Committee should review and approve the risk assessment and scope of the audit
plan prepared by the coordinator. The Audit Committee should also consider the coordinator's
requests for expansion of basic extended audit services when significant issues arise or when
significant changes occur in the institution's environment, structure, activities, risk exposures,
or systems. Major changes in an institution's environment and conditions may lead to changes
in the internal control system and may warrant additional extended audit services. These
major changes include: (a) new management; (b) areas or activities experiencing rapid growth;
(c) new lines of business, products, or technologies; and (d) corporate restructurings, mergers,
and acquisitions.
The coordinator will be the primary person responsible for evaluating the findings and results
arising from extended audit activities. The coordinator will be responsible for reporting
internal control deficiencies to the appropriate level of bank management as soon as they are
identified and, for significant matters, to the Audit Committee.
The coordinator will be the principal person responsible for reporting extended audit activities
to the Audit Committee. We can plan to meet with the Audit Committee and assist the
coordinator in this regard, but we cannot report to the Audit Committee on behalf of
management or the coordinators. The Audit Committee should assess whether internal control





Bank management is responsible for establishing and maintaining effective internal controls
and for ensuring that the importance of internal control is understood and respected
throughout the institution. Effective internal controls reduce the likelihood that the following
will occur and remain undetected: inaccurate, incomplete, or unauthorized transactions;
deficiencies in the safeguarding of assets; unreliable financial and regulatory reporting; and
deviations from laws, regulations, and the institution's policies. However, it does not
completely eliminate that possibility. Our work does not guarantee that errors or irregularities
will not occur and may not detect errors or irregularities should they occur. Bank management
will perform periodic reviews to determine, and shall be solely responsible for determining,
when, whether, and how the recommendations suggested by Crowe Chizek under this
engagement are to be implemented.
Bank management has the responsibility to determine whether the Bank's systems, or any other
systems such as those of the Bank's vendors, service providers, or any other third parties, are
Year 2000 compliant and to determine whether the Bank has addressed or will be able to
address all of the affected systems on a timely basis. Our extended audit services conducted in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards are not designed to detect whether such
systems are Year 2000 compliant.
The Bank will provide reasonable work space for Crowe Chizek personnel at the audit
locations. Bank management will also insure that all information provided to us is accurate
and complete in all material respects, contains no material omissions, and is updated on a
prompt and continuous basis. Bank management will also assume responsibility for obtaining
all third-party consents required to enable us to access and us~ any third-party products
necessary to the performance of the audit plan.
During the engagement term, the Bank will cause its Audit Committee and/ or management
team to meet with Crowe Chizek personnel at such times as Crowe Chizek may from time to
time reasonably request. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Crowe Chizek shall
have full and regular access to the Bank's Audit Committee and/ or management team and
shall be entitled to meet with the Audit Committee in private without any member of bank
management being present. Crowe Chizek shall report solely to the Bank's audit coordinator or
management and/ or the Audit Committee with respect to the performance of its obligations
under this engagement letter.
The Bank shall indemnify and hold harmless Crowe Chizek and its personnel from and against
any payment, loss, cost, or expense (including reasonable attorney's fees) paid or incurred by
Crowe Chizek at any time and in any way relating to claims by any of the Bank's employees or
former employees, except to the extent finally determined to have resulted from the gross
negligence or willful misconduct of Crowe Chizek personnel. This provision shall survive the





The Bank agrees that Crowe Chizek shall not be required to undertake any task or function
which Crowe Chizek determines would impair its independence under the Code of
Professional Conduct of the AICP A, any pronouncements of banking regulators and the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission, or other relevant rules.
FEES
Billings for our services will be This fee includes out-of-pocket expenses. Billings will
be submitted on a monthly basis and are due upon receipt. Fees and expenses for any
additional projects or services will be agreed to and billed separately. We will, of course,
discuss any changes to our extended audit services with your coordinator prior to performing
any additional work.
Please sign and return the enclosed copy of this letter to indicate that it is in accordance with
the Bank's understanding of the arrangements outlined above and to designate the Bank's
extended audit coordinator.
Very truly yours
Crowe, Chizek and Company LLP
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